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6.1. The prevalence of envelope wages and the fear of unemployment
István János Tóth & Mihály Fazekas
There are different types of undeclared work. A 
worker can be (a) employed by an unregistered 
business, (b) employed illegally by a registered busi-
ness, (c) employed legally by a registered business 
and receive one part of their wage declared to the 
tax authorities and the other part as an undeclared 
envelope wage. If a worker is not employed by the 
company although effectively works there and re-
ceives his/her payment against a VAT invoice issued 
by another company (typically his/her own) then 
this is considered a variant of case (b) or (c).
This chapter explores whether the crisis has had 
an impact on the prevalence of envelope wages and 
it also looks at the relationship between previous 
unemployment experience and workers’ willing-
ness to accept envelope wage payments. First, the 
potential effects of the crisis will be discussed, then 
the data for the analysis, and finally the main find-
ings will be presented.
In terms of undeclared work, registered busi-
nesses could have responded to demand and sup-
ply shocks associated with the crisis or unrelated 
government shocks (such as the increase of the min-
imum wage, statutory pay increases etc.) in a num-
ber of ways: 1) they laid off some of their workforce 
and “re-employed” them illegally, 2) increased the 
share of envelope wage payments within the work-
ers’ pay package, or 3) they increased the proportion 
of undeclared workers against declared workers, in 
extreme cases they froze hiring legally and only took 
on undeclared workers who were then paid envelope 
wages. All three adjustment strategies lead to the in-
crease of envelope wage payment both in terms of 
prevalence and amount.
On the contrary, it might also be argued that the 
crisis and government measures had a negative im-
pact not only on companies that register their em-
ployees but on the undeclared labour market as well. 
Demand for the products of businesses employing 
undeclared workers also declined despite their rela-
tive advantage in terms of labour cost compared to 
their competitors that employ registered workers 
(to a greater extent). Furthermore the decline in the 
share of undeclared work might also be associated 
with sectoral factors: due to the decline in consump-
tion (particularly consumer services characterised 
by high under-reporting) and its stagnating at a low-
er level than before the crisis, or the collapse of the 
construction industry in Hungary, companies that 
relied more heavily on undeclared work might have 
been more likely to leave the market or reduce the 
number of their (undeclared) workers.
However, another possibility is that the flat in-
come tax introduced in 2011 might have created 
incentives for declared as opposed to undeclared 
work for both employers and – particularly higher-
paid – employees through the reduction of the tax 
wedge and no changes in the probability of inspec-
tion. These potential effects could have reduced the 
prevalence and extent of envelope wage payments.
The sum of the various effects can only be estab-
lished with empirical analysis using multiple data 
sources. This chapter presents the relevant findings 
of two surveys that can provide useful information 
for further economic analysis. The first survey took 
place in 2008 and the second in the spring of 2012, 
both using a sample of 1,000 adults from the general 
population aged between 18 and 60 years.* Data was 
representative and homogeneous in terms of gender, 
age groups and type of settlement in both surveys.
Results suggest that at least 14.6% of 18–60 year 
olds received envelope wage payments at least once 
in the previous two years in 2008, while the same 
figure was 14.4% in 2012 – therefore the situation 
has not changed over the past four years. The survey 
also asked those who received part or all of their pay 
as an envelope wage to estimate the share of their 
last such pay within their total net earnings. Again, 
there were no considerable changes compared to 
the situation before the crisis: 29 per cent said that 
they received less than a quarter of their net earn-
* For the questionnaires and main characteristics of the 
surveys see link in the on-line version.
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ings as an envelope wage payment, 17 per cent said 
less than half, eight per cent said no more than three 
quarters, three per cent said more than that but not 
their total pay, and 44 per cent stated that they re-
ceived their total pay as an envelope wage.
There were various changes in the relationship be-
tween the prevalence of envelope wage and the char-
acteristics of workers over the past four years; how-
ever the direction and strength of correlations often 
remained the same. For example, receiving enve-
lope wage payments was more common among men 
(18–19%) than women (11%) both in 2008 and 2012.
Similarly, the willingness to accept envelope wage 
payments was consistently associated with previous 
unemployment experience. While 9 per cent of re-
spondents who had never been unemployed received 
envelope wage payment in 2008 and 2012, 22 per 
cent of those who had experienced unemployment 
before said that they had received envelope wage 
payments within the previous two years.
With regards to other factors, there were some 
changes. In 2008 envelope wages were significantly 
more prevalent among workers in Budapest (19%) 
than those in the countryside (14%); by 2012 the situ-
ation changed and they became less prevalent in Bu-
dapest (12%) and increased somewhat among those 
living in the countryside (15%). There were similar 
changes in the age groups of workers: while in 2008 
envelope wages were more common in the age group 
under 30 (21%) and 30–44 (16%) (their prevalence 
being 9% above 45), in 2012 the prevalence of enve-
lope wages was high only among young people (20%) 
and in the other two age groups it was 13%.
Looking at the characteristics of people who take 
up undeclared work in the 2008 survey, it emerges 
that envelope wage payment was particularly com-
mon in a clearly defined group of workers (those 
avoiding poverty) – see Fazekas et al. (2012). This 
group is characterised by not having any assets apart 
from the property where they live, have a low lev-
el of education, work in semi-skilled or vocational 
jobs and often they or one of their family members 
has already experienced unemployment. People in 
this group move between a) legal employment with 
fully declared pay, (b) undeclared work and (c) un-
employment. This highlights the link between un-
employment and the prevalence of envelope wages. 
It can be assumed that the acceptance of undeclared 
or mixed pay is heavily influenced by the risk of un-
employment. If there is such risk or it is higher, then 
the worker is more likely to accept envelope wage 
payments as well. The risk of unemployment was 
measured by asking the question “have you ever 
been unemployed since you first started working?” 
and the number of months in work during the pre-
vious year. The analysis of this relationship on the 
pooled database of 2008–2012 shows a correlation 
in the expected direction between past unemploy-
ment and receiving envelope wage payments (the 
probability of this is 2.7–3.2 times higher). The same 
result is obtained if gender, education, type of set-
tlement and age are included in the analysis as con-
trol variables.**
** For detailed results see link in the on-line version.
6.2. Minimum wage or minimum tax?
Mirco Tonin
What is the interaction between minimum wage leg-
islation and the underreporting of earnings? Tonin 
(2011) looks at this issue by investigating the mas-
sive minimum wage increase that took place in Hun-
gary in 2001, when the statutory monthly minimum 
wage was increased from 25,500 HUF (98 EUR or 
90 USD using the average exchange rate for 2000) 
to 40,000 HUF (156 EUR or 140 USD using the av-
erage exchange rate for 2001).
The basic idea is that the minimum wage can have 
an impact on compliance, as it usually represents 
the smallest possible amount that has to be declared 
to be in the official economy. The impact is similar 
when declaring a sub-minimum amount is permis-
sible, but attracts higher scrutiny by the tax author-
ity (Tonin, 2013a).
In an environment in which firms and workers 
can collude to report to the fiscal authorities an 
